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Abstract: 
Providing operators with objective incentives for cost efficiency and continuous 
improvement in the provision of public services are major concerns for 
regulators.  Measuring efficiency empirically is complex and this complexity is 
accentuated when the same operator is responsible for delivering more than one 
service (e.g. in order to explore potential economies of scope). Based on a sample 
of operators that provide water and wastewater services, this paper uses a shared 
input data envelopment analysis model to measure separately the efficiency of 
each service. The results show that a single measure may not provide enough 
information for monitoring multi-utilities. Together with other indicators, the 
proposed model can assist decision-makers in prioritizing efforts to improve 
overall efficiency. 
Keywords: cost efficiency; multi-utilities; shared input DEA; water sector. 
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1. Introduction 
Measuring the cost efficiency in the delivery of public utility services is of crucial importance. 
For the same level of service, higher efficiencies should lessen the burden on rate and/or 
taxpayers (if there is regulatory pressure). However, when the same operator delivers more than 
one service, performance measurement becomes more challenging (Torres and Morrison, 2006) 
and global efficiency measures tend to be less useful. Traditional methodologies do not always 
highlight in which service efficiency is lower: a key issue for both decision-makers and 
regulators. 
 
In a given territory, water and wastewater services are often jointly provided by the same 
operator. In fact, empirical evidence supports the argument that there are economies of scope 
between drinking water supply and wastewater collection/treatment/disposal, especially in 
smaller utilities (Abbott and Cohen, 2009). Most methodologies used in the literature to 
evaluate the performance of water utilities only estimate overall efficiencies and do not assess 
the cost efficiency of each activity (e.g. see Gomez and Rubio, 2008 or Romano and Guerrini, 
2011 for a general overview of the literature). It could be the case that, for example, a given 
operator is cost efficient in drinking water supply and inefficient in the delivery of wastewater 
services. Using an overall efficiency score would not highlight this conclusion in a 
straightforward manner. Although evaluating the overall efficiency of operators in these cases 
still has significant value, managing to separate the efficiency of the water and wastewater 
services could be of further use for decision-makers and regulators. 
 
Several methodologies have been used to assess the performance of water and wastewater 
services (Berg and Marques, 2011).
1
 A conventional classification is the division between 
parametric and nonparametric methodologies, and both have their strengths and limitations (for 
a more detailed discussion see Fried, 2008). Despite being widely used in the literature, 
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 For simplicity, in this paper we use the term ‘water utilities’ to refer to operators that jointly provide 
drinking water and wastewater services in a given territory. 
3 
parametric methodologies require an a priori definition of the cost or production function and 
the acceptance of various assumptions derived from economic theory (which may reduce the 
acceptability of the results by some members of the scientific community). Nonparametric 
methodologies use the information ‘within the data’ to estimate efficiency scores and they do 
not require as many assumptions or constraints
2
. Among the many methodologies available, the 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) is the most frequently used by researchers. By means of linear 
programming, DEA estimates a best practice frontier using the inputs and outputs of all 
observations and computes efficiencies using the most favorable weights for each decision-
making unit (DMU). 
 
The information asymmetries between regulators (independent agencies or local authorities) and 
operators (public or private) hinder the effectiveness of the regulatory framework (Berg, 2000). 
Frequently, the lack of transparency and sufficient detail in the annual statements of the 
operators do not allow the proper design and monitoring of incentives for cost efficiency. 
Although there are several operators that already do this explicitly in their financial statements, 
incurred costs (operations and capital) and staff are not typically allocated to the corresponding 
service (in our case, water and wastewater). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
application of a nonparametric model designed to estimate the cost efficiency of each output 
(i.e. each service) in the water sector, when both services are jointly provided by the same 
operator.
3
 
 
The objective of this paper is to propose a model for estimating not only the overall efficiency 
of water utilities, but also the cost efficiency in each of the services provided. In this case, the 
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 However, nonparametric methodologies also have some drawbacks. For instance, they are very sensitive 
to extreme data and outliers, they suffer from the ‘curse of dimensionality’ problem and they are 
deterministic methodologies with a non-statistic nature. 
3
 Evidently, we are referring to the use of the shared input DEA model (see section 3.3). There are several 
cases where regulators use (partial) performance indicators to assess the cost efficiency of each service. 
See, for instance, the case of the Portuguese regulator (ERSAR, 2010). 
4 
two services under analysis are drinking water and wastewater services. Using a shared input 
DEA methodology (see Beasley, 1995; Cook and Green, 2004; and Cook et al., 2000), the 
authors are also able to report estimates for the cost shares that correspond to each service. 
Naturally, this methodology could prove to be very useful for regulators and decision makers 
who wish to benchmark their services against the best practices of the sector. 
 
This article is organized in the following manner. After this introduction, section 2 briefly 
describes the importance of economic regulation in the water sector. It addresses some 
international experiences and the difficulties of putting in place an effective framework of 
incentives for cost efficiency. Section 3 presents the shared input DEA model along with the 
data used to assess its usefulness (consisting of 253 observations from 45 Portuguese water 
utilities for the period 2002-2008). Section 4 summarizes the results obtained and, finally, 
section 5 provides a discussion, concluding the paper.  
 
2. Economic regulation and incentives for cost efficiency in the water sector 
The water utilities industry presents several features (market failures) that justify regulatory 
intervention (either implicit or explicit). Among the many concerns, the existence of economies 
of scale and economies of scope, the ‘essential’ character of the services and their impact on the 
well-being of society, the existence of asymmetric information, the need for very high (sunk) 
investments and long-lived assets, and the occurrence of negative (and positive) externalities, 
should be highlighted (Marques, 2010). These market failures might lead to mismanagement 
(lack of effort to improve efficiency) and/or misconduct (setting prices above cost recovery 
levels and thus earning abnormally high profits). Hence, the presence of regulation is crucial for 
the protection of customer as well as other stakeholder interests. Regulation intends to work as 
an “invisible hand” that provides the right incentives for the regulated companies to become 
more productive (Witte and Marques, 2010).  
 
5 
Due to the asymmetric information environment and the magnitude of other market failures, 
performance-based or incentive regulation is gaining importance in the water sector (Marques, 
2010). This regulatory process, sometimes called ‘yardstick competition’, is based on the use of 
benchmarking tools and in the scorecards obtained to make judgments for the future (Shleifer, 
1985). One of the main advantages is the fact that it offers strong incentives towards efficiency 
and innovation by the water operators, both in their operation and capital expenses (OPEX and 
CAPEX, respectively). In addition, this methodology also fosters transparency and the sharing 
of information. 
 
Concerning the regulation of water utilities the literature distinguishes two different 
benchmarking approaches (Marques, 2006). The first relies on the benchmarking used to set the 
operators’ prices and tariffs. The types of benchmarking tools used are diverse, varying on the 
actors and on the features of the countries involved. The UK, Chile and Colombia are some 
remarkable examples of countries which apply this regulatory methodology. The second 
approach concerns ‘sunshine regulation’ which consists of the comparison and public discussion 
of the operators’ performance. Sunshine regulation is very popular in the water sector, not only 
because it is easily applicable but also because it is better accepted by the water utilities. Several 
countries, such as Portugal, Australia, Brazil or Zambia have applied this ‘name and shaming’ 
regulatory methodology with good outcomes. 
 
Regarding the methodologies used in the scope of the first approach, econometric and 
mathematical programming methodologies are dominant, particularly frontier methodologies 
such as stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) or DEA. These methodologies use the best practices 
as benchmarks and normally encompass multiple inputs and outputs. Since these methodologies 
estimate overall measures of efficiency, they are known as total or global methodologies (see 
Fried et al., 2008). The second approach uses partial methodologies such as performance 
indicators (see Alegre et al., 2006), for example the number of employees per thousand of 
connections or number of bursts per 100 km of mains length. These indices provide only a 
6 
partial portrait of the issue under analysis but due to simplicity and ease of understanding they 
are quite popular in the water sector, mostly among engineers and managers. Hence, partial 
measures are widely used by the operators for managerial purposes and by the regulators to 
supervise the quality of service. In this article, we will focus on the first regulatory 
benchmarking approach and on the costs and efficiencies of water and wastewater services 
(regulation of multi-utilities). 
 
Many regulators all over the world are using benchmarking and performance-based regulatory 
methodologies (Marques et al., 2011). In order to oversee the quality of service and/or to set 
prices and tariffs watchdogs are ‘using and abusing’ this tool (Berg, 2010). Benchmarking 
allows gathering insights to perform real interpretations of the way utilities work but its careless 
use might be perverse (Marques and Witte, 2010). One of the major problems is the comparison 
of ‘apples with oranges’, which is particularly more serious when operators provide different 
services such as water, wastewater, electricity or gas (multi-utilities). This paper develops and 
proposes a methodology to overcome this issue by disentangling the costs and relative 
efficiencies per service provided. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Background: Portuguese water sector 
Currently (2012), in Portugal, as in many countries namely in continental Europe, drinking 
water supply and wastewater services are the responsibility of local governments. One 
distinctive feature of the Portuguese water sector is the significant vertical disintegration of 
service provision: ‘wholesale’ and ‘retail’ services are usually delivered by different operators 
(Cruz et al., 2012). In drinking water supply services, the ‘wholesale’ segment encompasses all 
activities from water abstraction to reservoir storage (including transportation and treatment). 
Regarding wastewater services, this segment includes the transportation, treatment and disposal 
of wastewater. The ‘retail’ segment of drinking water services therefore consists in the storage 
and distribution of water to final consumers. Residential wastewater collection corresponds to 
7 
the ‘retail’ segment of this service. ‘Wholesale’ services are provided by regional operators 
while municipalities typically ensure the provision of ‘retail’ services in their jurisdictions. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the market structure of the Portuguese water sector. 
 
 
[Insert table 1] 
 
 
The publicly-owned regional operators in charge of ‘wholesale’ services consist of public-
public partnerships where the central state is the major shareholder (and the municipalities 
served by these operators are minor shareholders, Marques, 2008). There is also one private 
concessionaire operating in the ‘wholesale’ market. Of the 21 operators in this segment, three 
provide water abstraction, treatment and storage services, six provide wastewater treatment and 
disposal services and 12 provide both types of services. 
 
Most semi-autonomous operators in the ‘retail’ market are municipally-owned (municipal 
departments, municipal services or municipal companies). However, since the 1990's, private 
participation in the water sector has been showing a steady increase, mainly through public-
private partnership (PPP) arrangements. Currently, around 21% of the Portuguese population is 
served by purely contractual (e.g. concessions) or institutionalized (mixed capital companies) 
PPP arrangements (Cruz and Marques, 2012). The majority of the ‘retail’ operators provide both 
drinking water and wastewater services. One should note that many of these operators also carry 
out some activities that are classified as ‘wholesale’ services. 
 
Another defining aspect of the Portuguese water sector is the regulatory framework in place. 
Unlike most EU countries, Portugal has a sector-specific regulator: The Water and Waste 
Services Regulation Authority (ERSAR in the Portuguese acronym). The intervention of this 
regulatory agency has been mainly focused on quality of service issues (by carrying out a 
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sunshine regulation approach, see Marques, 2006). In fact, an annual performance assessment, 
which covers only concessionaire companies, has been conducted since 2003 using the public 
disclosure of results as a 'name and shame' strategy. In addition, all 'wholesale' operators have 
been under explicit economic regulation. Recently, the regulatory power and jurisdiction of 
ERSAR was enlarged to encompass all water utilities. 
 
3.2 Description of the sample 
Our sample includes utilities that operate in the Portuguese ‘retail’ segment and exclusively 
provide drinking water (D) and wastewater (W) services.
4
 The data refers to a seven-year period 
(2002-2008). Thus, the sample contains 253 observations from 45 water utilities serving about 
4.4 million inhabitants (of a total of 10.6 million). Figure 1 provides a graphical representation 
of the four types of operators studied in this paper. The capital letters ‘D’ and ‘W’ are used to 
refer to drinking water and wastewater services, respectively. The lowercase letters are used to 
distinguish the operators that carry out ‘retail’ (‘r’) services and the ones that also perform 
‘wholesale’ (‘w’) services.5 For instance, Dr-Wwr operators provide drinking water supply 
(water ‘retail’ service) and wastewater collection and treatment (wastewater ‘wholesale’ and 
‘retail’ services). 
 
 
[Insert figure 1] 
 
 
Since there are many more operators in the retail segment, we chose to apply the shared input 
DEA model to the water and wastewater ‘retail’ market. Regional operators were excluded from 
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 Some utilities in the sample also carry out such services as water abstraction or wastewater treatment.  
5
 We consider that an utility carries out ‘wholesale’ services when its own bulk water production is more 
than 50% of the total water used in the network (regarding the drinking water supply activity) or when it 
has wastewater treatment plants (regarding the wastewater treatment activity). 
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the analysis to maintain the consistency of the sample (moreover, the number of ‘retail’ 
customers is included as an output variable in the model). All 'retail' operators that also provide 
municipal solid waste (or other) services were equally excluded from the sample. Figure 2 
displays the number of operators according to the type of services provided distributed over 
time (on the left) and the percentage of the total number of observations recorded throughout the 
period 2002-2008 (on the right). 
 
 
[Insert figure 2] 
 
 
This study uses total cost (in euros) as an input to the model. This variable includes capital costs 
(sum of depreciation and interest paid) and operational costs. As outputs we considered the 
number of customers of drinking water supply services and the number of customers served by 
wastewater collection. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of these input and output 
variables (overall and for the four clusters of operators). The data were obtained from the annual 
account reports published by the water utilities and from the annual reports of ERSAR. Since 
the aim of water utilities is to reduce the inputs consumed for a given level of outputs delivered 
(minimize costs for a predetermined level of service), in the following analysis an input 
orientation was adopted. 
 
 
[Insert table 2] 
 
 
 
3.3 A shared input DEA model 
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Most methodologies used in the performance evaluation literature (either parametric or 
nonparametric) only allow for the estimation of the global efficiencies of each DMU. If the 
DMU carries out several activities, the analyst is not able to learn which one is the least (or the 
most) cost efficient. In this paper we implement a nonparametric methodology that allows us to 
estimate overall and partial cost efficiencies (corresponding to each of the services provided by 
the DMUs). More specifically, this study intends to evaluate the cost efficiencies of the drinking 
water and wastewater services for the operators that provide them together. The methodology 
proposed also allows estimating the share of the total costs allocated to each of the two services 
for each water utility. This is useful because, occasionally, operators report their costs without 
detailing the cost shares of each service provided. The methodology is based on the DEA 
technique, initially developed by Charnes et al. (1978) by extending the ideas of Farrel (1957) 
and Debreu (1951). 
 
Although parametric methodologies are dominant in the performance measurement literature, 
nonparametric models present several ‘competitive advantages’: there is no need to choose a 
functional form to represent the cost or production function, information about prices of inputs 
is not necessary and one does not require so many assumptions. ‘Traditional’ DEA, as for most 
methodologies in the literature, simply allows the analyst to estimate an overall efficiency ke  
for the DMU k. These efficiency measures are defined as a ratio between a weighted sum of 
outputs and a weighted sum of inputs. The methodology selects the optimal weights associated 
to the respective inputs and outputs in order to maximize the overall efficiency of each DMU. 
This is especially useful when the details on the exact (real) relative importance of the inputs 
and outputs in the production or cost function are unknown. 
 
The first proposal for this methodology was the following. Consider that 
px   are the p 
inputs used by n DMUs to produce the q outputs
qy   and that iu  and lv  are the weights of 
the outputs and inputs, respectively: 
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This formulation corresponds to an input orientation; i.e. it is implicit that the DMUs aim at 
rationalizing/minimizing input consumption for a given level of output production. As 
mentioned above, this is also the orientation adopted in the present study. It is assumed that, for 
water utilities, demand is an exogenous variable and the objective is to deliver the services at 
least possible cost for the population. 
 
The formulation presented in (1), however, has a drawback: it presents an infinite number of 
solutions and the computation is quite complex (Coelli et al. 2005). To overcome these 
problems, we consider another constraint which is to assume that the denominator of the 
objective function is equal to the unit: 
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Later on, this formulation evolved to its dual form: 
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kemin  (3) 
s.t. 
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The model described above considers the existence of constant returns to scale (CRS). 
According to Banker et al. (1984), to assume a variable returns to scale (VRS) technology one 
needs to add the constraint 1
1
 
n
i i
  to the formulation on (3). 
 
The DEA methodology uses linear programming to construct a nonparametric piecewise linear 
frontier over the data. The efficiency scores of observations are computed against that frontier.
6
 
However, as already mentioned, DEA models have some shortcomings. On the one hand, it 
simply provides one overall efficiency score for operators that deliver several services or 
produce many outputs; this does not allow regulators to know the partial efficiencies (and cost 
shares) corresponding to each activity or service. On the other hand, DEA models adopt input 
and output weights for the computation of efficiency scores that are not necessarily real. In the 
current study we use and adaptation of the DEA model that allows for estimating the cost shares 
allocated to each output or service provided by the DMUs. This is particularly relevant for 
multi-utilities operating in the water sector because the annual account reports do not always 
present incurred costs per type of activity carried out. This information is only known by 
managers (if known at all). 
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 The observations located on the frontier are considered to be cost efficient and have efficiency scores 
equal to the unit. Observations that lie below the ‘best practice frontier’ are regarded as inefficient, 
exhibiting efficiency scores below the unit. 
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To estimate the cost share of each activity as well as the respective cost efficiencies, we 
implement a shared input DEA model as suggested by Beasley (1995) and others, such as 
Jahanshahloo et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2010). This adapted DEA model computes the cost 
shares and partial efficiencies simultaneously, envisaging the maximization of the overall 
efficiency. To this end, the constraints (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6) are added to the formulation shown 
in (3). Thus, the model goes as follows: 
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Where i  is the ratio of inputs (costs) associated with service i and ke  is the overall cost 
efficiency score of DMU k. As in ‘traditional DEA’, higher scores indicate higher overall cost 
efficiencies. 
 
On constraint (4.4), the parcel  
r
i jii
yu
1
 consists of the sum of the r weighted outputs 
concerning activity i and  
s
l jlli
xv
1
  the s weighted inputs consumed in activity i. In the 
current study, since there is only one output associated with each service and only one input for 
both activities (total costs), this is simplified to 0 jllijii xvyu  . The objective of this 
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constraint is to compute the optimal cost shares for each DMU, imposing that the partial cost 
efficiency scores kie  are below the unit. Furthermore, the constraint (4.5) ensures that the total 
costs are fully allocated to the various activities carried out by the DMUs. Constraint (4.6) 
allows for the imposition of a minimum and maximum cost share to be allocated to activity i, 
which is useful when one has some knowledge regarding the actual range of these values. The 
methodology will look for the most favorable option within the admissible range of values in 
order to maximize the overall efficiency of each DMU. In the current study we opted not to 
include limits to the values for the cost shares. Instead, we adopted the constraint 21 uu  . This 
restriction imposes a higher weight for the drinking water services (in relation to the wastewater 
services). This makes sense because 1) in all Portuguese municipalities the number of drinking 
water customers is always higher than the number of customers of wastewater services (not all 
customers have a connection to the wastewater network), and 2) experience shows that, 
generally in Portugal, drinking water services have higher costs associated. 
 
At last, the overall (aggregate) cost efficiency scores are determined through the partial cost 
efficiency estimates kie  weighted by the respective DEA-estimated cost shares: 
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q
i kiik
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1

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Where the partial cost efficiency scores kie  are defined as a ratio between the weighted sum of 
the r outputs concerning service i and the weighted sum of the s inputs consumed by service i: 
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In the following sections the partial cost efficiencies 1ke  and 2ke  refer to drinking water 
services and wastewater services, respectively. In a similar fashion, 1  and 2  refer to the 
inputs (costs) allocated to drinking water services and wastewater services, respectively. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Using the shared input DEA model described in the previous section we were able evaluate the 
cost efficiency of the different activities carried out by the water utilities (drinking water and 
wastewater services). During the process the estimates for the cost shares of the services were 
also computed for all operators. The results confirm the expectation that, typically, drinking 
water services are more relevant in the cost structure of the operators (i.e. 21    for a 95%: 
confidence level: p-value of the Kruskal-Wallis test = 5.555e-078 < 0.05). In fact, on average 
and regarding the Portuguese ‘retail’ segment, drinking water services are responsible for 64% 
of the total costs (while the remaining costs are allocated to wastewater services). Table 3 
presents the overall and partial cost efficiency estimates along with the respective cost shares for 
all observations in the sample. As we have mentioned above, for the same DMU, the sample 
includes values from different years. In our formulation, the cost shares are allowed to vary 
freely from one year to the other and this could lead to inconsistent results. However, the results 
show that the cost share estimates do not change significantly for the same operator. 
 
 
[Insert table 3] 
 
 
Although the results reveal that, on average, drinking water services seem to be slightly more 
efficient than wastewater services (i.e. 21 kk ee  ) this difference is not statistically significant at 
a 95% confidence level according to the results obtained by the Kruskal-Wallis test (p-value = 
0.729 > 0.05). As it can be seen in figure 3, the partial cost efficiencies 1ke  
and 2ke  are directly 
16 
correlated indicating that, in general, the operators exhibit similar partial cost efficiencies for 
both services, although some have higher efficiencies for drinking water services (when the 
average partial cost efficiency 1ke  
is higher than the average of 2ke ). Note that, for regulators 
and managers, it is interesting to learn where each operator is standing in the scatter plot of 
figure 3. 
 
 
[Insert figure 3] 
 
 
As shown in figure 4 and tables 4 and 5, if we cluster the observations by type of services 
provided (see figure 1) it is possible to discern that ‘retail’ operators that also carry out drinking 
water ‘wholesale’ services present higher overall and ‘ 1ke ’ efficiencies. This could be an 
indication of the presence of economies of vertical integration for drinking water services. 
These results are in line with the literature. Indeed, economies of vertical integration have been 
observed in the water and wastewater sectors, particularly in smaller utilities (Abbott and 
Cohen, 2009). Furthermore, the ‘Drw-Wrw’ operators correspond to the observations that 
present higher cost efficiencies for wastewater services (‘ 2ke ’). This obviously makes ‘Drw-
Wrw’ and ‘Drw-Wr’ operators the most efficient ones (especially the ‘Drw-Wrw’ operators). 
Figure 4 ant table 4 also present the ‘traditional DEA’ CRS and VRS efficiency scores. 
 
 
[Insert figure 4] 
 
 
[Insert table 4] 
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[Insert table 5] 
 
 
Figure 5 helps us to illustrate the usefulness of the model presented in this paper. To a great 
extent, more than drawing wide-ranging conclusions about a sector, this methodology is 
especially useful for evaluating each operator individually. In addition to the shared-input DEA 
overall and partial efficiencies, this graphical representation also shows the CRS, VRS and scale 
efficiency (SE) scores for each cluster of operators.
7
 Note that drawing these spider charts for 
each individual operator would be very relevant both for regulators and managers (creating a 
sort of “water utility scorecard” that provides detailed information to the analyst). This way, one 
is able to have the perception of the overall efficiency of the operator and also learn on which 
services there is more room for improvement. 
 
 
[Insert figure 5] 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
The results show that the major share of the total costs of multi-utilities providing water and 
wastewater services are allocated to drinking water supply (around 64%, on average). The 
shared input DEA model also allowed us to conclude that there is no statistical significant 
difference between the efficiencies of drinking water services and wastewater services. 
Furthermore, it seems that vertically integrated operators (providing ‘retail’ and ‘wholesale’ 
drinking water and wastewater services) have higher cost efficiencies for both services and 
therefore also in overall terms. This is an interesting finding with potential policy implications 
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 SE scores are obtained by dividing CRS scores by VRS scores (using the ‘traditional DEA’ model). 
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(that go against recent reforms, for instance, in Portugal and the Netherlands). However, 
detecting the presence of economies of vertical integration is neither the major objective of this 
paper nor the main usefulness of the shared input DEA model. Additional research should be 
carried out on this topic regarding the Portuguese ‘retail’ water and wastewater markets. 
 
As we have shown (for instance in figure 5), used in conjugation with ‘traditional’ 
methodologies for measuring global performance, the model proposed in this paper to 
disentangle the cost efficiency of water and wastewater services can generate more information 
that is useful for the missions of regulators and managers. Since it allows for identifying 
asymmetric performances in water and wastewater services when these are jointly provided by 
the same operator, the methodology would especially useful for the operators that are far away 
from the central tendency (regression), as exemplified in figure 3.  
 
The usual lack of transparency and detailed financial information regarding the management of 
water utilities often hinders the effectiveness of regulation. The proposed methodology tries to 
cope with this reality and provides a solution to the classic problem of information asymmetry. 
Moreover, as the primary regulators of the water and wastewater services provided in their 
jurisdictions, municipalities are in need of useful tools for monitoring their utilities. Indeed, the 
exercise carried out in this paper could be repeated individually for all water utilities. The 
shared input DEA model does not only provide local governments with their ‘global’ picture, it 
also allows for the identification of those activities for which there is still room for 
improvements. Finally, the fact that the methodology implemented computes the most favorable 
cost efficiency score for each operator (as in ‘traditional DEA’ and given the proper 
constraints), increases the acceptability of the model as a performance assessment tool. 
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 Figure 1 – Types of water utilities in the sample according to their degree of vertical integration 
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Figure 2 – Number of operators and number of observations clustered by type of service provided 
 
 
 Figure 3 – Scatter plot of the partial cost efficiency scores 1ke  
and 2ke   
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4 – Plot of shared input DEA overall and partial cost efficiency scores and DEA efficiency 
scores clustered by type of utility (average values) 
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Figure 5 – Detailed information on the cost efficiency of water utilities (average values) 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Market structure of the Portuguese water sector. Source: ERSAR (2010). 
 Management model 
 Private (no.) Mixed (no.) Public (no.) 
‘Wholesale’ segment 1 0 20 
‘Retail’ segment 28 5 246 
Note: not all ‘retail’ segment operators are served by the wholesale operators 
 
 
Table 2 – Summary statistics of input and output variables for the utilities in the sample 
 
Statistics Average Median 
St. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Utilities 
(no.) 
Obs. 
(no.) 
   
 All utilities 
Input Total costs (€) 12,168,457 7,547,850 12,037,577 895,154 53,061,841  
253 Outputs Water customers 48,359 30,400 45,290 4,553 185,784 47 
Wastewater customers 36,154 18,672 39,790 1,222 185,561  
 
 
 Dwr-Wwr 
Input Total costs (€) 6,595,039 4,899,671 5,522,676 986,866 24,348,746  
103 Outputs Water customers 30,719 24,971 25,418 4,553 105,243 18 
Wastewater customers 21,760 13,747 22,507 1,223 102,643  
 
  
 Dwr-Wr 
Input Total costs (€) 8,752,367 8,978,700 4,051,488 3,687,439 15,343,292  
22 Outputs Water customers 38,779 29,016 16,714 19,839 59,189 5 
Wastewater customers 22,257 18,543 10,362 14,600 51,293  
 
  
 Dr-Wwr 
Input Total costs (€) 16,945,857 12,277,266 14,560,864 1,550,328 53,061,841  
80 Outputs Water customers 63,159 39,077 53,758 7,059 185,561 14 
Wastewater customers 49,697 36,404 49,289 3,346 185,561  
 
  
 Dr-Wr 
Input Total costs (€) 17,731,457 10,837,313 14,249,212 895,154 41,896,638  
48 Outputs Water customers 65,937 35,068 56,569 4,915 185,784 10 
Wastewater customers 50,836 27,616 46,703 4,464 147,141  
 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of the estimates for water utilities cost efficiencies and cost shares 
  
Average St dev. Min Max 
25 
percentile 
50 
percentile 
75 
percentile 
Efficiency 
estimates 
ke  0.530 0.138 0.154 1.000 0.432 0.522 0.605 
1ke  0.523 0.135 0.246 1.000 0.444 0.506 0.592 
2ke  0.515 0.199 0.000 1.000 0.387 0.511 0.655 
Cost 
share 
estimates 
1  0.641 0.107 0.179 1.000 0.602 0.602 0.631 
2  0.359 0.107 0.000 0.821 0.369 0.398 0.398 
 
 
Table 4 – Shared input DEA overall and partial cost efficiency scores and DEA efficiency scores 
clustered by type of utility (average and median values) 
  
Drw-Wrw Drw-Wr Dr-Wrw Dr-Wr All 
A
v
er
a
g
e 
ke  0.598 0.565 0.465 0.473 0.530 
1ke  0.593 0.569 0.452 0.470 0.523 
2ke  0.550 0.534 0.485 0.482 0.515 
CRS-DEA 0.688 0.651 0.551 0.564 0.618 
VRS-DEA 0.742 0.731 0.654 0.646 0.695 
M
ed
ia
n
s 
ke  0.591 0.527 0.491 0.444 0.522 
1ke  0.571 0.577 0.451 0.486 0.506 
2ke  0.605 0.547 0.491 0.476 0.511 
CRS-DEA 0.672 0.616 0.561 0.544 0.604 
VRS-DEA 0.780 0.777 0.676 0.586 0.693 
number of observations 103 22 80 48 253 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 – Results obtained by Kruskal-Wallis test when comparing the shared input DEA overall 
and partial cost efficiency scores clustered by type of utility 
 
Drw-Wrw Drw-Wr Dr-Wrw 
Drw-Wr 
Overall eff. (0.407) = 
  
1ke  
(0.856) = 
2ke  
(0.529) =     
Dr-Wrw 
Overall eff.  (1.800e-9) ≠ Overall eff.  (0.002) ≠ 
 
 1ke   
(3.987e-12) ≠ 
2ke   
(0.002) ≠ 
1ke   
(3.667e-6)  ≠ 
 2ke   
(0.420) =   
Dr-Wr 
Overall eff. (2.945e-7) ≠ Overall eff. (0.004) ≠ Overall eff.  (0.902) = 
1ke   
(1.921e-7) ≠ 
2ke   
(0.005) ≠ 
1ke   
(2.000e-4) ≠ 
2ke   
(0.330) = 
 1ke   
(0.174) = 
2ke   
(0.723) = 
p-values in parentheses; = means that the samples are not statistically different to the 95% confidence level; ≠ 
means that the samples are statistically different to the 95% confidence level 
 
 
 
 
